



Pension Risk Management

Modeling the Pension Liability

October 2004

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President

The institutional setting

What characteristics of a pension liability differentiate this problem?

Current practice

How do plan sponsors and plan fiduciaries view the pension obligation?

- **The Institutional Setting** – Pension Investment Decisions
- **The Traditional View** – The Sponsor’s Liability
- **The Contemporary View** – The Fiduciary’s Liability
- **Implications** for Pension Risk Management
- **Current Practice** as Observed by NISA
- **Emerging Issues**

I'm **not** an accountant!

I'm **not** an attorney!

I'm **not** an actuary!


I **am** an investment advisor, but
this is **not** investment advice!

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
Recent Evolution of the “Average Pension Plan”

Key Variable	1999	2004
Funded Status	Overfunded	Underfunded
Funding Requirements	Contribution Holiday	Required Contribution
Funding Liability	Actuarial Liability	Current Liability
Periodic Pension Cost	Pension Income	Pension Expense
Balance Sheet	No Liability	Additional Minimum Liability, Loss of Prepaid Pension Asset

One Source of Deteriorating Funded Status: Poor Asset Performance




Equally Important: Dramatic Increases in Liability Present Values




Surplus Volatility is Greater than Asset Volatility

A Hypothetical Plan's Funded Status



- Surplus = Assets – Liabilities
- Funded Status = Assets/Liabilities



Sponsors are Seeking Prescriptions to Limit Their Risks

- Minimum required contributions
- Additional funding charges
- PBGC premiums
- “Forced, voluntary” contributions



Cash Flows

- Adjustments to expected returns on assets
- Smoothing mechanisms in accounting rules



Net Income

- Recognition of underfunded ABO
- Loss of prepaid pension asset




Book Value

- Ratings
- Low equity valuations
- PBGC oversight
- Participant notification




Business Activities

Institutional Arrangements that Distinguish the Pension



Plan Sponsors Have Authority To


- Make contributions
- Terminate the plan
- Amend the benefit agreement
- Add participants
- Apply surplus funding to other plans



Sponsor acts as a fiduciary in all aspects of investment of plan assets

Fiduciary Responsibilities

- Manage assets of the plan solely in the interest of participants
- For the sole purpose of providing benefits
- Act prudently
- Avoid conflicts of interest



Fiduciaries who do not follow these principles of conduct may be personally liable to the plan

Conventional Plan Design Features

Common features of benefit agreements

- Benefits based on years of service
- Benefits based on final pay
- Annuity or lump sum payouts

Less common features of benefit agreements

- COLAs
- Ad hoc benefit increases
- Cash balance plans

General features of US Tax code

- Pension contributions deductible to a limit
- Asset earnings exempt from tax
- Surplus recovery subject to excise tax

PBGC – Insurance


The **Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC)** is a federal corporation that guarantees pension benefits in plans that clearly define benefits for more than 25 employees. The corporation administers terminated plans and places liens on the company's assets for any pension benefits that were promised but not delivered.*

PBGC Authority

- Contribution rules
- Participant notification
- Approval of new plans, plan mergers and plan terminations

Remaining Risks for Plan Beneficiaries

- Limits on covered benefits
- Insured *earned* benefit, uninsured *anticipated* benefit
- Creditworthiness of PBGC




Subject to override by Congress


Can PBGC insurance be a consideration?


Myriad Rules Governing Required Contributions

- Relevant liability measures: *Actuarial* liability and *Current* liability
- Assets may be smoothed
- Balance in Funded Standard Account may delay contributions



PBGC – The Asymmetry of Contributions






The SEC's authority extends beyond disclosure requirements.

Certain data required to be disclosed can be challenged – for example, expected investment returns, as false and misleading.

The Traditional View – The Sponsor's Liability

Corporate sponsor's perspective

- Maximize equity value
- Limited liability
- Exploitable insured benefits
- Tax shelter



Recall:

ERISA:


Plan Sponsors Have Authority To

- Make contributions
- Terminate the plan
- Amend the benefit agreement
- Add participants
- Apply surplus funding to other plans


Fiduciary Responsibilities

- Manage assets of the plan solely in the interest of participants
- For the sole purpose of providing benefits
- Act prudently
- Avoid conflicts of interest

Institutional Arrangements:



Recognize Separate Responsibilities and Authorities



- A sponsor will attempt to **capture a funding surplus**, if any develops.

- A fiduciary's position is analogous to that of a **secured lender** who controls the investment of collateral.

Contrast to the conventional model:

- Fiduciary as an investor has **no incentive to produce surplus**.
- Fiduciary as an investor views potential additions to benefits (e.g., from **salary inflation, future service, etc**) as a risk factor since they may diminish collateral coverage.


The Contemporary View – The Fiduciary’s Liability

Fiduciary’s perspective

- Minimal to no benefit from surplus
- Participants have no claim on surplus
- Fiduciaries are not to take into account potential sponsor benefits from surplus


How should a fiduciary view the surplus?

- Anticipated increments to benefits
- Anticipated contributions
- “Game” between sponsor and fiduciary




How Can a Fiduciary Capture the Benefit of a Potential Surplus?

Pension Liability – Revised Model



- Can a sponsor “monetize” its natural position?

One Possibility



- One example: Sell claims on returns in states of the world where surplus will develop.

What Liability Management Strategies Does NISA See Clients Using?

Long Bonds

- Long Treasury and corporate bonds, STRIPS, agency zeros
- Relatively easy to implement
- Challenges: Convexity matching, funding the strategy

Bonds + Derivatives

- Treasury and corporate bonds, interest rate swaps and Treasury futures
- Larger universe of bonds to exploit
- Challenges: Monitoring and management of combined, overlapping strategies

Derivatives

- Interest rate swaps, Treasury futures
- Plan assets can be invested in other instruments (equities, alternative investments, etc.)
- Challenges: Spread duration matching, OTC relationships with counterparties, comfort with derivatives



Exotics

- Interest rate swaptions, total return swaps, credit derivatives
- Can be used to express a view through a non-linear payoff profile
- Challenges: Trading and valuation of thinly traded OTC instruments

Example #1 – Long Bonds

Client Background

- Corporate pension plan
- CCC-rated sponsor
- **12.7y duration liability**
- 77% funded ratio




The allocation to long duration fixed income hedges approximately 38% of the liability.

Example #2 – Long Bonds + Derivative Overlay



Client Background

- Corporate pension plan
- BB-rated sponsor
- **15.2y duration liability**
- 138% funded ratio
- Overlay of interest rate swaps

Asset Portfolio



Dollar Duration




The allocation to long duration fixed income plus the interest rate swap overlay hedges approximately 82% of the liability.

Example #3 – Derivative Overlay



Client Background

- Corporate pension plan
- CCC-rated sponsor
- **15.0y duration liability**
- 54% funded ratio
- Overlay of interest rate swaps

Asset Portfolio



Dollar Duration





The allocation to fixed income plus the interest rate swap overlay hedges approximately 10% of the liability.

Example #4 – Derivative Overlay

Client Background

- Corporate pension plan
- BBB-rated sponsor
- **10.0y duration liability**
- 99% funded ratio
- Overlay of interest rate swaptions




The allocation to fixed income plus the interest rate swaption overlay hedges approximately 40% of the liability.

A Representative Pension Hedge Engagement – For Illustration Purposes Only

Client Background

- Corporate pension plan
- BBB+ rated sponsor
- **\$3.5b, 12y duration liability**
- \$3.2b assets
- \$733m fixed income assets: \$506mm Aggregate and \$227mm high yield



	Current Allocation	1-year VaR	Assumed Volatility
Domestic Equity	\$1,520	-\$502	
Large Cap	\$774	-\$243	19.0%
Mid Cap	\$359	-\$120	20.3%
Small Cap	\$354	-\$126	21.5%
Company Stock	\$33	-\$13	24.6%
International Equity	\$468	-\$166	
Int'l Core	\$319	-\$101	19.2%
Int'l EM	\$149	-\$65	26.4%
Specialty Investments	\$438	-\$126	
Hedge Funds	\$264	-\$40	9.1%
Private Equity	\$174	-\$86	30.0%
Fixed Income	\$733	-\$71	
Core	\$506	-\$40	4.8%
Hi-yield	\$227	-\$31	8.4%
Cash	\$130		
Total Assets	\$3,219	-\$679	12.8%
Current Liability	\$3,500	\$655	11.3%
Surplus	-\$281	-\$1,030	17.8%

Comparison of the Fixed Income Assets vs. the Liability


Illustrative Engagement

Portfolio Components	[A]	Yield	[B]	[C]	[D]	[A x B]	[A x B x D]	[A x C]
	Market Value (\$mm)		Duration	Convexity	Spread "Beta"	\$Duration (\$mm)	\$Spd Dur (\$mm)	\$Convexity (\$mm)
Lehman Aggregate	506	4.18	4.49	(0.22)	0.50	2,272	1,136	(111)
High Yield	227	8.48	4.77	0.14	3.00	1,080	3,241	32
TOTAL PORTFOLIO	733	5.51	4.58	(0.11)	1.31	3,352	4,377	(80)
LIABILITY	3,500	6.00	12.00	3.00	1.00	41,996	41,996	10,499
DIFFERENCE						(38,643)	(37,618)	(10,578)
% Hedged vs. Liability						8%	10%	(1%)

Portfolio Components	Market Value	Yield	Duration	Convexity	Spread "Beta"	\$Duration (\$mm)	\$Spd Dur (\$mm)	\$Convexity (\$mm)
	(\$mm)							
Lehman Aggregate	506	4.18	4.49	(0.22)	0.50	2,272	1,136	(111)
High Yield	227	8.48	4.77	0.14	3.00	1,080	3,241	32
IR Sw aps (\$1160 mm notional)	0	0.00	11.68	2.29	0.25	13,543	3,386	2,657
TOTAL PORTFOLIO	733	4.18			0.46	16,896	7,763	2,577
LIABILITY	3,500	6.00	12.00	3.00	1.00	41,996	41,996	10,499
DIFFERENCE						(25,100)	(34,232)	(7,921)
% Hedged vs. Liability						40%	18%	25%
% Improvement vs. Aggregate Portfolio						32%	8%	25%




Cashflow Evaluation of Alternative Strategies

Illustrative Engagement



VS. →

Cashflow Exposure Net of Liability




Pension Fund Simulation

- Useful to compare different strategies
- Inputs include (among others): asset returns, correlations, actuarial factors, accounting rules
- Multi-period, dynamic model


Illustrative Output

- Mark to Market Surplus (Assets minus ABO Liability)
- Surplus Less PV of Contributions
- Smoothed Assets to Smoothed Liability

**Marked-to-Market minus ABO Liability (Surplus)
Base Allocation (No Hedge)**



**Marked-to-Market minus ABO Liability (Surplus)
2006**



- Strategies for troubled plans
- Choice of pension liability to hedge
- Price level sensitivity of the pension obligation
- Interest rate sensitivity of equity
- The strategies of sponsor and participant